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Abstract:
This paper compares the different multi-level climate and energy governance in China, the European
Union and the United States. While many comparisons across these three economies exist, they
concentrate on comparing the climate and energy “policy instruments” and their results. This paper puts a
focus on the importance of institutionalized multi-level governance processes, i.e., the “politics” - the
actors and interaction processes inherent in a mode of governance, and the “polities” - the institutional
setting. How are priorities and targets decided from both bottom-up and top-down processes? How do
the central governments exert control over local authorities and ensure the implementation of their
policies? How do the central governments enforce and evaluate the results of the policies? And finally,
how do citizens play a role in the multi-level governance in these three blocs? Analysis of multi-level
governance highlights the importance of target setting and cadre evaluation in China whereas legislation is
the dominant process in the EU and the US.
This paper is part of a series of working papers comparing the climate and energy policies of China, the
EU, and the US to better understand the geopolitics surrounding global decarbonization.
Keywords: Multi-level Governance, Climate Policy, Energy Policy, Energy Transition, China, the
European Union, the United States.
1. Introduction
Many countries are developing strategies both globally and domestically to tackle the climate change crisis.
The three largest economies that are aiming at net-zero are China, the European Union (EU) and the
United States (US).
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would reach its carbon emissions peak before 2030
and achieve “carbon neutral” before 2060 on the 5th session of the UN General Assembly in September
2020. This is dubbed the “dual carbon goals (双碳目标)”. In alignment with this announcement, China
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has submitted its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). CO2 intensity will be reduced by
more than 65% from 2005 levels by 2030, and non-fossil fuel percentage in primary energy consumption
will reach 25% by 2030 (China’s New NDC - E3G Responds, 2021). Despite the ambitious headline goal,
there is not yet a clear pathway mapped out to reach the dual carbon goals. In August 2021, Xie Zhenhua,
China’s special climate envoy, announced the “1+N” carbon policy. The “1” refers to the “guiding
opinions” that sets out the overarching principles and “N” will include a “carbon peaking action plan” – a
10-point plan that will cover actions from all major emitting sectors (energy, industry, infrastructure, and
transport) as well as other key policy areas for climate action (circular economy, technology, finance,
economic policies, carbon trading, nature-based solutions).
In the US, President Biden signed an executive order to rejoin the U.S. into the Paris climate agreement
on his first day in office. After rejoining, the Biden administration updated their National Determined
Contribution (NDC) and pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and cut its greenhouse gas
emissions 50 per cent to 52 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. In 2021, the Build Back Better
Framework was introduced to set the United States on course to meet its climate targets. The 1.75 trillion
bill included $555 billion of investments in clean energy and other climate change initiatives, seen as the
new cornerstone of the federal climate policy.
In the EU, the European Green Deal serves as a comprehensive policy package to set EU-wide goals: cut
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels to set Europe on a responsible
path to becoming climate neutral by 2050. In July 2021, the European Commission unveiled a new
climate action plan “fit for 55”, which consists of 13 legislative proposals, including the Emissions
Trading Directive (ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), the Regulation on Land-use, Land-use
Change and Forestry (LULUCF), the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and a
Governance Regulation for the process of planning, reporting and review.
With China being the largest emitter (25.7% of the world total), followed by the US (12.8%) and the
EU(27) (7.8%)1, together they are responsible for around 46% of today's carbon emissions
(ClimateWatch, 2018). At the same time, the three economies account for more than a quarter of the
world's population and 60% of world GDP.
Effective multi-level governance is crucial to achieving headline goals and overarching policies set forth by
the central or supra-national level administrative unit. Economies like China, the US and the EU have
complicated internal administrative units. The internal administrative units, such as the 31 provinces2 in
China, 27 Member States in the EU and 50 states in the US, have significant variations in terms of
population, economic size, culture, socio-economic status and geo-climatic conditions. While global-level
cooperation and negotiation and national-level policies are crucial to climate actions, it is of equal

1

Preliminary global greenhouse gas emissions 2018 excluding land-use change and forestry (LUCF) from
Climate Watch.
2
The United Kingdom is no longer be a Member State of the European Union as of 1 February 2020
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importance to look at the different layers of internal governance. How are priorities and targets decided
from both bottom-up and top-down processes? How does the central government exert control over local
authorities and ensure the implementation of their policies? How does the central government enforce
and evaluate the results of their policies? And finally, how does public opinion play a role in the multilevel governance in these three blocs?
While many comparisons regarding climate change actions across these three economies exist, they
concentrate on comparing the policy instruments and the results. Our comparison, instead, puts a focus
on the importance of institutionalized governance processes, i.e., the “politics” and the “polities”. Using
the framework from Gong et al (2020), polity refers to “the institutional setting, structural side of
governance, or the rules of the game”. Politics refer to "the actors and interaction processes inherent in a
mode of governance". We compare the institutionalized governance processes based on the theory of
multi-level governance, i.e. how policies are implemented from central to local, or supranational to the
national structure. The key question we aim to answer is, how climate and energy policies are formulated
and implemented effectively at different levels. By comparing the limits and potential of each country’s
governance, we can identify opportunities to maximize the effectiveness of each model in their terms,
instead of forecasting or recommending the convergence of governance models in different economies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 detail the polities and multi-level governance
models in the three blocs. We then proceed to the comparison and summary of differences in the
governance models in section 3. Section 4 provides a deep dive into the role of citizens and public
opinions in multi-level governance. Section 5 concludes.
2. Multi-level governance
2.1. High-level and medium-level admin units
Table 1 summarises the two layers of administrative units considered in this paper (Noussan et al., 2021).
For China and the US, the higher-level administrative unit is the central/federal government whereas the
EU is the Union of countries. The medium-level administrative unit for China is provinces3 for the EU
are the countries and for the US, states. These administrative units are chosen to ensure the scale and thus
the relevance of these two layers are comparable.
Table 1 – Main features of the three economies considered in this analysis.

high-level admin. unit

type

Total population4

million (2019)

China

European Union

United States

Country

Union of countries

Country

1,398

448

328

3

We would like to remark that the term “provinces” in this paper refers to provincial-level
administrative regions, including both provinces and autonomous regions. We have chosen to use
"provinces" to simplify the wording.
4

World Bank Data, Total population, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
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Total GDP5

billion USD

14,280

15,626

21,433

7,519

2,912

4,391

(2019)
Power generation6

TWh (2019)

medium-level admin. units

type

number

-

population (max)

Provinces

Countries

States

31*

27**

50***

million (2019)

115.2

83.2

39.5

population (mean)

million (2019)

45.1

16.6

6.6

population (median)

million (2019)

38.8

8.9

4.3

population (min)

million (2019)

3.5

0.5

0.6

GDP7

billion USD

1,562

3,080

3,133

461

579

429

357

199

250

25

12

34

(max)

(2019)
GDP (mean)

billion USD
(2019)

GDP (median)

billion USD
(2019)

GDP (min)

billion USD
(2019)

* Excluding the 2 Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau) and 1 disputed region (Taiwan). ** The
European Union considered in this study is the EU-27, after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) on Jan 31st
,2020. *** Excluding District of Columbia.

2.2 China
2.2.1 Polities of climate and energy governance in China
The political system in China consists of vertical lines and horizontal lines. Vertically, each administrative
division of the Government of China is supervised by their vertical superior. Horizontally, they receive
strategic guidance from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the same level, meaning that the party
leads on everything. (Fig 1)
Within the government of China, the central government established the National Leading Group for
Climate Change, Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction (国家应对气候变化及节能减排工作
领导小组) in 2007, led by the Premier Li Keqiang. The Leading Group serves as a cross-departmental
coordination mechanism for any climate change and energy-related issues. For example, the Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Ecology and Environment, Minister of Natural Resources, Minister of

5

World Bank Data, Nominal GDP, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
Source: ENERDATA (2021).
7
Sources: https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103 (with 1 USD = 6.91 CNY),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00001/default/table?lang=en (with 1 Euro = 1.12 USD),
https://apps.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1&acrdn=1
6
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Transport and Minister of Finance are all included in the leading group, to ensure a holistic view and
consistency across climate and energy-related policies (State Council, 2019). As of June 2021, a new
climate “leading group” is established to achieve the “dual carbon goals”. The new leading group is led by
vice-premier, Han Zheng, who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the
Communist Party of China. Han Zheng is also the head of the Central Ecological and Environmental
Inspection Team (CEEIT), a top-level institution to ensure the implementation of ecological and
environmental regulations (You, 2021).
The two most important ministries that are directly responsible for climate and energy policies are the
Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE) and the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC). NDRC is in charge of organizing the formulation of the Five-year Plan, the most crucial
document that outlines the country’s economic and societal development priorities for every five years. At
the same time, China’s National Energy Agency (NEA) sits under the NDRC, giving NDRC the
competence to formulate energy-related policies. On the other hand, the Department of Climate Change
sits under MEE. The mandate of the Department of Climate Change includes internal climate mitigation
and adaptation strategy formulation, international climate negotiation and compliance with the UNFCCC,
as well as market mechanism development such as the carbon emission rights trading markets. At the
provincial, municipal and local levels, the administrative divisions replicate the structure at the national
level. At each level, they all receive guidance from the CCP such as the provincial party congress and
committee as well as local-level party organizations.
Figure 1 – Overall governance structure between the CCP and government
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The central-local relationship in China, historically, has not been fixed. It shifts like a pendulum, swinging
from decentralization to re-centralization. This swing can be reflected by the fiscal revenue distribution
between the central and local governments. The 1980s witnessed a shift from the centralised arrangement
for fiscal revenue and spending to a "separate accounting for income and expenditure" (分灶吃饭).
Reform and opening up and the expansion of market power allowed provincial and sub-provincial local
governments to retain a larger proportion of their revenues and to spend them freely, leading to an overall
decentralisation process (Z. Li, 2013). However, the 1994 tax reform transformed again the relationship
between central and local government. The reform allowed the central government to share 75% of valueadded tax and local government 25% of VAT, therefore giving the central government more control over
fiscal revenue. As of today, the central government retains approximately half of the fiscal revenue, but
local governments account for 85% of the general government budget (Wingender, 2018). This mismatch
between revenue and spending results in an important mechanism for the central government to balance
among, incentivise and control local governments: transfer payment. A transfer payment is a redistribution
of fiscal income. The purposes are three folds: to promote equal development among regions, e.g.
redistribute income to western and less developed areas; to support the provision of public goods via
special transfer payment, such as in basic health care; and to incentivise specific policy goals e.g.
environmental protection.
Therefore, contrary to the common belief that China is a highly centralised and top-down decisionmaking machine, many scholars have pointed out that the Chinese political system can be described as
“fragmented authoritarianism” or “decentralised authoritarianism”, where spaces for negotiation,
bargaining and consultation exist within the system.
2.2.2 Multi-level governance model between central and provincial governments
This decentralised authoritarian system functions through three incentive mechanisms (Ren, 2018), as
shown in figure 2, namely: political incentives through tasks and campaigns; financial incentives through
transfer payment; and promotion incentives through target responsibility and cadre evaluation.

Figure 2– Three incentive mechanisms between Chinese central and local governments, Translated
from (Ren, 2018)
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All three mechanisms play a central role in climate and energy governance. The characteristic of political
campaigns is time-bound and is of paramount importance compared to other priorities. Implementing
policies through political campaigns are effective to achieve short-term results, but are not sustainable for
long-run changes. A case in point is the air pollution clean-up campaign during the 2014 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum held in Beijing. To reduce air pollution and ensure blue sky in a
short amount of time, the central government mobilized Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi and
Inner Mongolia. During the months before and during the forum, the priority of reducing air pollution
outweighed economic growth. 9,298 factories in the regions surrounding Beijing were forced to suspend
production and another 3,900 factories limited production. More than 40,000 construction sites were
closed (Ye, 2015).
The other central-local governance mechanism is through financial incentives, especially through transfer
payments. As mentioned before, the 1994 tax reform led to a mismatch between revenue and spending at
local government levels. Transfer payments are an important income source for local governments,
especially in western China and less developed regions to incentivise specific policy goals e.g.
environmental protection. One environment-related transfer payment mechanism is the “ecological
compensation mechanism” established in 2005, to incentivise key ecological functional regions to
conserve and restore nature. In 2021, the fiscal budget for ecological transfer payments amounts to more
than 13 billion USD (88.2 billion RMB). As the “dual carbon goals” rose to top priorities, specific transfer
payments for net-zero goals were also planned. A statement from the Ministry of Finance in August 2021
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021
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committed to transfer payments to local governments to restore grasslands, wetlands and forests to
increase carbon sequestration.
Apart from the aforementioned two mechanisms, at the centre of the Chinese central-local governance
mechanism for climate and energy is the target responsibility, or the cadre evaluation system. It is the
mechanism of evaluation of bureaucratic personnel which then determines the promotion or demotion.
The target responsibility system can be best understood using an analogy to corporate management.
Priorities and key performance indicators (KPIs) are set by top leadership, but tactics to reach the targets
were left to the lower level’s discretion. Each level of bureaucrats is evaluated every year against these
KPIs, which may lead to either political promotion or demotion.
2.2.3 Deep dive in FYP target setting, implementation and evaluation
For China, the national priorities and targets are outlined in China’s Five-Year Planning, a process led by
the National Development and Reform Commission. Targets in the FYP are divided into two types:
anticipatory targets and binding or obligatory targets. Anticipatory indicators are targets that the state
desires to achieve, but the final results mainly depend on the autonomous behaviours of market players,
such as the economy and well-being related targets. In comparison, binding indicators are targets that the
state requires to achieve, such as environmental protection and food security-related targets. Only binding
indicators are cascaded down to provincial and local level government and accountable ministries are
designated.
Among the 20 key indicators laid out in the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP) for 2020 to 2025, eight indicators
are binding, among which four targets concern energy and climate targets, namely “Reduction in energy
consumption per unit of GDP(%)”, “Reduction of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%)”, “Forest
coverage rate (%)” and “Comprehensive energy production capacity” (see table 2).
Table 2 – Main indicators of economic and social development during the 14th FYP period
Category

Indicator

2020

2025

Annual average

Nature

Economic

GDP growth (%)

2.3

--

Keep it within the

Indicative

development

reasonable interval, each
year depending on the
situation
Labour productivity growth (%)

2.5

--

Higher than GDP

Indicative

growth
Innovation

Urbanization rate (%)

60.6

65

Growth in R&D spending

--

--

Indicative
Growth > 7 percent.

Indicative

Aim for a higher share in
GDP than 2.2 %
Number of innovation patents

6.3

12

Indicative

Digital economy share of GDP

7.8

10

Indicative

Growth in disposable income

2.1

--

per 10,000 people
Well-being

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1353
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Urban (survey) unemployment

5.2

<5.5

Indicative

10.8

11.3

Binding

2.9

3.2

Indicative

91

95

Indicative

1.8

4.5

Indicative

77.3

--

rate
Average years of education of
the working-age population
Number of licensed physicians
per thousand population
Basic pension insurance
participation rate (%)
Nurseries for infants under 3
years old per thousand people
Average life expectancy (years)

1 year (cumulative in 5

Indicative

years)
Ecology

Reduction in energy

--

--

consumption per unit of GDP

13.5% (cumulative in 5

Binding

years)

(%)
Reduction of carbon dioxide

--

--

emissions per unit of GDP (%)
Share of days with good air

18% (cumulative in 5

Binding

years)
87

87.5

Binding

83.4

85

Binding

23.2%

24.1%

Binding

quality in cities at prefecture level
and above (%)
Share of surface water at or
better than class III (%)
Forest coverage rate (%)
Security

Comprehensive grain production

>650 million tons

Binding

Comprehensive energy

>4.6 billion of coal

Binding

production capacity

equivalent

capacity

Target setting during the FYP follows a “stratified policy formulation” process (分层决策、 平行编制、
纵向引导) (Lv & Tang, 2018). Decisions are made horizontally at the central and local levels, but the
central government gives strategic guidance to the local level.
Figure 3 – stratified policy formulation FYP process, translated from (Lv & Tang, 2018)
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In short, it can be described as a multiple-round negotiation process between central and local, where the
central government takes into account the voluntary target-setting submitted by provinces and gives draft
targets with adjustments to ensure that nation-wide priorities are achieved (Figure 3). After the
negotiation, targets are reviewed and officially approved in the official FYP documents, thus becoming
binding for local governments. The actual performances are compared with the finalized binding targets,
which are in most cases always achieved.
The evaluation of the targets is based on both results and efforts. Take the “Reduction in energy
consumption per unit of GDP (%)” target in the 11th FYP as an example. Nation-wide energy reduction
target is a 20% decrease by 2010 compared to the level in 2005. The evaluation score is calculated as
follows: 40% is whether the province achieved the assigned binding target, and 60% is based on
completion of the eight key “Energy Saving and Emission Reduction (ESER) 节能减排” initiatives (Lv &
Tang, 2018).
Table 3 – 11th FYP “Reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP (%)” target
Provinces (not

Voluntary target

The draft target

Finalized binding

Actual

exhaustive)

setting by

from the central

target in FYP

performance

provinces

government

Guangxi

9.6

15

15

15.22

Yunnan

12.6

17

17

17.41

Guangdong

13,2

16

16

16.42

Beijing

15

20

20

26.59

Tianjin

15

20

20

21.00

Zhejiang

15

20

20

20.01

Hubei

20

20

20

21.67

Chongqing

20

20

20

20.95

Henan

20.5

20

20

20.12

Jiangsu

20.8

20

20

20.45

Shandong

22

22

22

22.09

Shanxi

25

25

22

22.66

Jilin

30

30

22

22.04

As a result of the cadre evaluation, bureaucratic personnel such as provincial governors or municipal
mayors compete with each other for good performances. The leaders who can achieve or over-achieve
targets are expected to receive awards, recognitions and promotions, whereas leaders who fail to achieve
binding targets can face consequences such as rectification, correction, or suspension of new high-energyconsuming projects in the area. If the region fails to reach the target after rectification and correction, the
government officials will be held accountable by supervisory departments.
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2.3 The EU:
2.3.1 Polities of climate and energy governance in the EU
The institutional set-up of the EU includes three pillars: the European Parliament, the Council of
Ministers and the European Commission. In principle, the national leaders within the European Council
set priorities. The Commission proposes new laws and budgets, and the Parliament and Council of
Ministers adopt them. The Commission and the Member States then implement them, and the
Commission ensures that the laws are properly applied and implemented. Within the EU Commission, the
Vice-President for the European Green Deal leads the work on the various legislative instruments under
the overall package.
The governance mechanism between the Union and the Member States depends on where the
competence lies. The EU has several exclusive competencies that are relevant to external third countries,
such as customs and trade policies. In this case, the Commission can negotiate and the Council can
conclude international agreements. In other cases, such as energy and international climate issues, the
competence is shared between the Community and the Member States. This also means that international
agreements must be ratified by Member States (Szapiro & Kaeding, 2013). However, the greater part of
this competence, such as for energy policy, lies with the Member States (Vogler, 2009). Whereas the EU
has the responsibility to ensure the security of supply, it is up to the Member States to determine the
structure of their energy supply and their choice of energy sources.
2.3.2 Multi-level governance model between the Union and the Member States
The EU climate and energy governance model is first and foremost underpinned by legislation. The
European Green Deal serves as a comprehensive policy package to set EU-wide goals, i.e. achieving
climate-neutrality by 2050 and reducing net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55% by 2030.
The European Green Deal was first presented in December 2019 by the European Commission,
following which the European Climate Law was published in the Official Journal on 9 July 2021 and
entered into force on 29 July 2021, which made both the new emissions reduction targets and the climate
neutrality goal binding. In July 2021, the European Commission unveiled a new climate action plan “fit for
55”, which consists of 13 legislative proposals.
The new “fit for 55” is built on many revisions to existing regulations and directives, such as the
Emissions Trading Directive (ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), the Regulation on Land-use,
Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy
Directive, and a Governance Regulation for the process of planning, reporting and review. The ETS, ESR
and LULUCF split the GHG emission coverage. ETS covers mainly the power sector and heavy industry
and only has an EU-wide cap without national sub-targets. ESR covers transport, buildings and agriculture
and has national sub-targets, which are based on "burden-sharing" negotiation within the council. Lastly,
LULUCF ensures that accounted GHG emissions from land use are entirely compensated by an
equivalent accounted removal of GHG from the atmosphere through action in the LULUCF sector.
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Apart from these six regulations/directives, the package also includes a combination of initiatives to
reduce road transport, maritime and aviation emission, as well as a revision of the Energy Taxation
Directive and setting a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
It is worth pointing out that there are different levels of legislation. Primary legislations are treaties and
secondary legislations include three types of law: regulations, directives and decisions. “Regulations” are
passed solely by the Commission or jointly by the Council and the Parliament. “Directives” are passed by
the Council and the Parliament. The difference between the two is that regulations require that the
Member States must implement uniformly by a shared deadline, whereas the directives allow certain
flexibilities for the Member States with varying deadlines based on different national conditions.
Apart from legislation, financial incentives are another important mechanism in the EU climate and
energy governance. For example, 30% of the programs in the EU’s 2021-2027 €2 trillion Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF) will provide support for climate action. 37% of the €723.8 billion Recovery
and Resilience Facility will also finance Members states’ climate action. Finally, a new Social Climate Fund
proposed within the “Fit for 55 packages" proposes to provide €72.2 billion in current prices for the
period 2025-2032 in the EU budget from the new Emissions Trading System (European Commission, 2021).
The fund aims at helping EU citizens meet the social and economic costs of the climate and energy
transition, especially the decarbonisation initiatives in the transport and building sector where vulnerable
households, micro-enterprises and transport users might be directly affected.
2.4 US:
2.4.1 Polities of climate and energy governance in the US
In the US, the climate and energy governances are based on the congressional legislation process, as well
as the regulation and enforcement carried out by the implementing agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DoE).
The executive branch includes the Office of Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change and the Office
of Domestic Climate Policy. Both have direct access to the president and are expected to work with
various councils such as the national security council, the national economic council, the council on
environmental quality and work with Congress. Similar to China's National Leading Group for Climate
Change, Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction, the US Climate Policy Office also convenes the
National Climate Task Force, which assembles Cabinet-level leaders from across 21 federal agencies and
departments. Under the National Climate Task Forces, various working groups were established to
advance specific priorities, such as the Climate Innovation Working Group to foster affordable, gamechanging technologies to combat climate change.
Compared to China and the EU, the climate change policies are more fragmented and there is a lack of
comprehensive federal control of GHG emission. Congress is responsible for the legislative process,
authorizing laws and overseeing the implementation of energy acts through the Senate and House of
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Representatives. However, the problem is that the chamber committee structures don't fit climate well
into anyone’s competence. One committee that has a macro approach to climate change in its totality is
the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, but the committee cannot draft legislation. They can
only make policy recommendations for the standing committees. So far, legislative proposals have
included carbon pricing frameworks such as the emission trading system and the carbon tax, sectoral
initiatives such as for standard development or research funding, and also budget bills such as the Build
Back Better framework, which includes $555 billion for climate investment. One example is the Clean Air
Act, which provides the foundation of many existing GHG emission policies. In 2007, the Supreme Court
found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate GHG emissions
from motor vehicles as air pollutants. This has significant implications for executive power because the
Biden administration can increase the stringencies for emission efficiency. For example, the EPA
proposed rule to strengthen federal GHG emissions standards for passenger cars and light trucks by
setting stringent requirements for reductions through the Model Year 2026 (EPA, 2021).
One of the key instruments for climate action from the executive branch is the Executive Order (EOs), a
way to issue federal directives from the President and requires no approval from Congress. However, they
are subject to judicial review and may be overturned. Previously, EOs were used by the Trump
administration to undo Obama-era rules by rolling back the limit on potent greenhouse gas emissions
from oil and gas fields and pipelines. Under the new Biden Administration, the president signed multiple
EOs to strengthen climate change actions, such as the Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at
Home and Abroad, Executive Order on Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks,
and the recently published Executive Order on Climate-Related Financial Risk (U.S. Climate Change Policy,
2021).
In terms of law enforcement and implementation, the implementation agencies, such as EPA and DoE
undertake the tasks and enforce the law. For example, the EPA works with states to reduce GHG
emissions under the Clean Air act. The DoE with the private sector to research, develop and deploy clean
energy technologies and establish standards for energy efficiency under the energy policy law. These
agencies can also shape regulations interpreted from the drafted law.
2.4.2 Multi-level governance model between the Federal government and States
Similar to the EU, the US federal-state governance is mostly driven by legislation. The federal and state
governments share certain authorities for making and enforcing laws. Under the Trump administration,
the US federal climate policy was largely lacking or moving in the wrong direction, which gives more
leeway for states to step in. For example, by April 15, 2020 states and territories have taken legislative or
executive action to move toward a 100 per cent clean energy future. The California carbon Cap-and-Trade
system is another example of an ambitious state taking more proactive actions. Launched in 2013, the
California emission trading system was the 4th largest program in the world. This state-level pioneering
initiative also provided valuable insights and learnings for further policy diffusion in other states. The
Mayors within the US also have robust climate policies. During the movement of 'We are still in', 125
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cities joined the coalition with nine states and hundreds of businesses and universities to sign an open
letter to show support (Holden, Mulkern, 2017). Today, the Climate Mayors has established a network of
470 U.S. mayors, representing 48 states and 74 million Americans to demonstrate cities’ leadership in
climate actions.
In terms of law implementation, although the EPA has the authority to enforce policies through fines,
sanctions, and other measures granted by the federal government, they often delegate monitoring and
enforcement to states. In general, the state environmental agencies are cumulatively more sufficiently
funded and have more capacity. For example, at the federal level, 15,000 people work in the U.S. EPA;
whereas New York City's Department of Environmental Protection has a staff of 6,000. The federal EPA
has an annual budget of $8 billion. In comparison, New York EPA spends about $1.5 billion a year
(Cohen, 2018).
Financial incentives through procurements, subsidies, investments and taxes are another key mechanism
of the governance between federal and state governments. For example, the budget bill for the “Build
Back Better” agenda introduced by the Biden administration in October 2021 includes around $555 billion
for climate change. The climate change provisions include tax credits for utility-scale and residential clean
energy, investments for resilience and climate adaptation, clean energy technology, manufacturing and
supply chain investments and clean energy procurement. However, it is worth noting that 90% of U.S.originated climate finance comes from private sources, including 57% of which comes from corporations
including project developers and utilities (The Landscape of Climate Finance in the United States, 2021).
3

Comparison between China, the EU and the US

China, the EU and the US have all made over-arching climate action pledges. To make sure that these toplevel commitments can be achieved, they need to be implemented effectively at the middle admin-unit
level, such as provinces in China, Member States in the EU and states in the US. The first paper in this
series (Noussan et al., 2021), showed that although the three blocs are all moving to decarbonisation
targets, the variability of electricity generation mix at the middle admin-unit level within each bloc is huge
in terms of energy sources (thermal, hydro, wind, solar, nuclear) and the balance between energy demand
and supply. Such complexity is the result of the different economic, (geo)political, environmental and
societal development stages in each of the middle admin-unit levels. This variability has implications for
the effectiveness of policy implementation. For example, wind power is gaining share in the generation
mix, especially in the North and North-west region. However, wind output curtailment has been a severe
problem in China, amounting to 11% in 2015 and 10% in 2016. The loss in economic and energy
efficiency is partially due to the fragmented institutional authorities and responsibilities, resulting in
mismatches in investment in installed wind power capacity and power transmission networks between
provinces (Qi, 2019). Therefore, middle admin-level policies and the governance model play a big role in
determining the effectiveness of decarbonisation policies. It is thus imperative to put more emphasis on
analysing the multi-level governance model, in addition to national or supra-national level targets and
policies.
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3.1 Comparison of the overall multi-level governance model
The three blocs all have different multi-level governance models to ensure effective implementation of
these targets, yet the three also share certain commonalities.
China aims to reach a carbon emissions peak before 2030 and to become “carbon neutral” before 2060. In
China, this overarching goal is set forth by the National Leading Group for Climate Change, Energy
Conservation and Emissions Reduction with strategic guidance from the CCP Standing Committee
Politburo. The ministries responsible at the central level are NDRC and MEE, with their corresponding
administrative unit being responsible at the provincial level, such as the provincial DRC and provincial
department of ecology and environment. The multi-level governance model consists of three main
instruments: political campaigns, target responsibility system demonstrated by the Five Year Plan (FYP),
and financial incentives mainly through transfer payment.
The EU has pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 to set Europe on a
responsible path to becoming climate neutral by 2050. The Commission, Parliament and Council of
Ministers work together to translate the overarching goal into the European Green Deal, a comprehensive
package of 13 regulations and directives. However, the enforcement mechanism for the European Union
to control the Member States is weak. For all the directives, the Member States have an obligation to make
national laws that give it effect, but they have a choice as to precisely how and when to do so.
Nevertheless, according to the Governance regulation, all Member States are required to submit National
Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to outline their climate and energy goals, policies and measures.
Financial incentives are also a key instrument for the Union to incentivize the Member States and ensure
burden-sharing.
The US has pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and cut its greenhouse gas emissions 50 per cent
to 52 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. The commitment is set forth by the Executive Office of the
President working closely with Congress to make sure the commitment can be translated into concrete
Executive Orders and Laws. Implementation agencies such as EPA, Department of Energy and
Department of Agriculture also issue regulations and policies, and they enforce the laws at the state level
either through their regional offices or through delegating to the states. The federal government also
provides financial incentives in the form of procurement, subsidies or taxes. The financial packages are
also introduced as budget bills and need to be passed by Congress.
3.2 Advantage and disadvantage of target responsibility system versus legislation
The most significant difference between the Chinese and the European and US government models is the
role of legislation in China. Despite the official rhetoric of the importance of "Rule of Law" in China, until
today, the bureaucratic target responsibility system remains at the centre of China’s governance apparatus
especially when it comes to climate change and energy-related issues, and legislation taking a secondary
role. This ambivalence attitude towards law can be explained by partially political concerns, such as loss of
control to courts, concerns about negative foreign influence on the legal system, or courts becoming a
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focus of citizen “rightful resistance”. It could also be attributed to capacity challenges, such as poorly
trained judges, low levels of lawyer professionalism etc (Wang, 2012). However, instead of reforming and
developing China’s legal system, the Chinese government relies on top-down party-state bureaucratic
mandates to drive the performance of new dual carbon goals. Laws are used more as a lagging indicator to
“memorialize or legalize” the priorities already established and operationalized by the target responsibility
system. For example, in 2020 the Department of Climate Change under the Ministry of Environment and
Ecology is finally starting to formulate Chinese climate action law. As early as 2012, the Institute of Law
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) already drafted the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Climate Change Response. The draft originally contained more than 200 clauses, but after
several rounds of consultations and review, the clauses were simplified and reduced to only 50, all
remaining at a relatively high level. It lost most of the specificities and practicalities and remained a draft
(Cao & Zhang, 2020). Thus, laws in China can be viewed more as an expressive statement of the priorities
and values that the party and the state cares about, rather than an instrument to implement the priorities.
There are certain advantages of using target responsibility and cadre evaluation mechanisms for multi-level
governance. First, it provides more flexibility to change targets than law. The FYP is formulated every five
years and does not require complex and cumbersome law-making processes. Effectiveness can also be
argued. For the past forty years, the system was able to motivate and identify stellar performers, while
generating at least a minimal level of performance from most bureaucrats. Lastly, it is historically familiar.
The FYP has been the central tool of China’s governance model since the 1st FYP from 1953-1957.
There are also disadvantages. First of all, the government bureaucrats are responsible for targets, but not
directly held accountable to the people because they are not elected officials. This might sometimes create
dilemmas between “achieving the targets” and “ensuring the well-being of the constituents”. For example,
in the winter of 2017-18, China’s central government launched an ambitious plan to convert large
numbers of coal-fired boilers to natural gas (or electricity heating). Hebei, which surrounds the capital
Beijing, has been on the front line of a campaign to cut smog. To reach the target of “coal-to-gas
conversion”, more than 2.5 million households across Hebei were converted from coal to electricity or
natural gas in 2017. The province also closed as many as 36,000 coal-fired boilers over the year. But gas
shortages and a lack of infrastructure have disrupted the operations of industrial firms across northern
China, and left some villages without heat amid sub-zero temperatures this winter, forcing authorities to
suspend the conversions (Li J., 2017). Another recent example is the power cut in the northeast of China
in 2021. Residents in the north-eastern area of China experienced a lack of heating and power cut-off
without warning. The shortage of power across China is mainly due to the rising price of coal due to the
reduced coal production to achieve carbon goals. In addition, a provincial “report card” was released for
the provincial performances of energy consumption and energy intensity. Many provinces have been
identified as off-track of meeting the targets and are expected to act immediately to get back on track.
(Fishman, 2021). In both cases, when potential conflicts between achieving targets and ensuring the wellbeing of the citizens, the target responsibility system might incentivise bureaucrats to optimize for
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performance, as long as the citizen discontent or unrest can be controlled and do not evolve into nationwide scandals. The second disadvantage of target responsibility is that it creates an incentive for local
governments to fake statistical numbers. For example, Zhang (2021) analysed the target responsibility
system’s impact on the accuracy of Energy intensity measured by energy consumption per unit of GDP, a
key binding target in the 14th FYP. The paper concludes that government target assessment can affect the
quality of statistical data, but the overall quality of statistical data has improved. Finally, not all climate or
environmental goals are quantifiable, and the quantified targets may not be the best proxies.
3.3 Other differences
Apart from the biggest difference in the role of legislation, there are several other notable differences
between the three political bodies.
First, the level and extent of policy enforcement are different. In China, the enforcement of central-level
policy at the local level is the strongest. The power is derived from promotion and demotion incentives. In
the US, the federal and state governments share authority. Although federal laws are also enforced by
implementation agencies such as the EPA or DoE, the enforcement is relatively weaker due to limited
capacity and funding at their regional offices. In comparison, the states not only have the authority to
make laws when the federal action is lacking or not comprehensive, but they are also better capacitated
and funded to enforce the state regulations and laws. In the EU, although the European Union can
impose financial or non-financial sanctions on the Member States when nonconformity or noncompliance arises, the mechanism is the weakest compared to in China or the US.
Secondly, both the European Member States and the US states have the authority to make new laws, thus
allowing them to take more proactive or progressive climate actions when there is a vacuum at the higher
admin-unit level. This also incentivizes more local-level policy innovations and encourages strong
networks and collaboration among states or cities. In contrast, in China, although the provinces have the
leeway to achieve the targets assigned by their superiors, they only have the freedom to design tactics, but
the overall direction must be aligned with central guidance. The policy innovation is also more of a topdown process. The central government picks a pilot region /area, allows piloting temporary rules, or
encourages the demonstration of a certain policy.
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4. Public participation in multi-level energy and climate governance
The need for wider public participation in energy and climate governance has become almost an
international consensus: whether top-down or bottom-up governance processes are pursued, public
participation is an essential part of multi-level governance, considering that public participation has been
included in various versions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (e.g.,
Article 6 of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement) (Sprain, 2016). Two arguments justify
public participation in energy and climate governance: firstly, that participation is a democratic right that
contributes to policy credibility and enhances capacity building; and secondly, that the inclusion of
different stakeholders and perspectives from different social groups is seen as beneficial to energy and
climate policy development and implementation, as wider participation helps to mobilise more knowledge
and voices (Sprain, 2016). However, there is no fixed and agreed pattern of public participation in energy
and climate governance. On the contrary, due to different “politics” as analysed above sections, as well as
distinct shapes of respective civil societies, public participation plays different roles in energy and climate
governance in China, the EU, and the US, and the depth and impact of participation vary.
4.1 China
For both the government and academia, Chinese society is still exploring what role citizens can play in the
fight against climate change. The white paper “China’s Policies and Actions to Address Climate Change
(《中国应对气候变化的政策与行动》)” published in October 2021 mentions that China’s response to
climate change is “people-centred” and takes fully into account “people’s aspirations for a better life and
their expectations for a better environment”. This white paper has been published annually since 2008,
and almost every year a chapter has been devoted to emphasizing the public participation of Chinese
society in addressing climate change. "Strengthened government leadership, increasing social awareness
and public participation" is the main feature of the activities summarized in these chapters.
At the institutional and legal levels, the Chinese government is actively promoting the construction of a
legitimate social action system for all people to participate in environmental protection (including energy
transition and climate action) through the formulation of guiding opinions and normative documents. A
policy issued by the MEE

in 2010 supports the involvement of non-profit social organisations in

environmental governance, while another guideline published by MEE in 2014 made it clear for the first
time that a sound public participation mechanism for environmental protection should be established to
encourage the general public to participate in environmental governance. In 2015, the amended
Environmental Protection Law stipulated the principle of public participation, while in the same year, the
Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Protection set out in detail the procedures for public
participation in environmental protection.8

8

This is based on a policy summary made in the MEE’s response to the opinion on whether Chinese
environmental social organizations are involved in environmental governance,
https://www.mee.gov.cn/hdjl/hfhz/201603/t20160315_332892.shtml.
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These laws and policies have paved the way for environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
to engage in climate activities in China. Currently, environmental NGOs are an important player in
Chinese civil society’s engagement with climate change. Taking one milestone as an example: the locally
based “China Civil Society Group on Climate Change (

中国公民社会应对气候变化小组)

” was

established in 2007, led by seven civil society organisations.9 They jointly published the “2009 China Civil
Society Position on Climate Change (《2009 中国公民社会应对气候变化立场》)" in 2009, and the
achievement was recognised in the 2010 version of China's Policies and Actions to Address Climate
Change as a spontaneous climate initiative by local NGOs. NGOs have formed a partnership with the
government in addressing climate change and joined global climate negotiations. However, in an overall
challenging and top-down dominated political environment, the space for NGOs to engage in campaigns
such as lobbying remains limited, especially for those organisations that lack a government-backed
background. In addition to the lack of funding, intellectual support and management, they also face a
society where perceptions and awareness of climate change are still evolving (Liu et al., 2020).
Another evidence of civil society involvement in energy and climate governance is the think tanks. China
has seen a boom in the development of think tanks in the field of climate change as a result of China’s
identification of a “new type of think tanks with special characteristics” as a national strategy in 2015
(State Council, 2015) and the rise of energy and climate issues. In addition to environmental NGOs acting
as think tanks and think tanks transformed from government organs, there has been an impressive
development of climate change think tanks set up by academic institutes and universities, such as the
Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development, Tsinghua University （清华大学气候变化与
可持续发展研究 and the Institute of Energy, Peking University （北京大学能源研究院）(Liu, 2021).
Despite their late start, these think tanks are playing an increasingly important role in China’s climate
policy-making and climate communication to the public today: for example, the Institute of Climate
Change and Sustainable Development, Tsinghua University released a forward-looking report, namely
“China’s Long-term Low-carbon Development Strategies and Pathways” last year with important policy
implications for the achievement of China’s carbon neutrality pledge, the formulation of the 14th Fiveyear Plan, and the updates on China’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contributions (Ma, 2020)
However, the development of think tanks is a long-term project since they are expected to undertake the
mission of knowledge empowerment for government, media, NGOs, and the public. It is supposed to
take a long time for China’s climate and energy-related think tanks to become a bridge between these
actors (Liu, 2021).

9

The seven NGOs are namely Chinese branches of Friends of Nature, Beijing Global Village, Green Earth
Volunteers, Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, Greenpeace, Oxfam, and ActionAid,
https://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=475&do=blog&quickforward=1&id=271542
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The participation of NGOs and the emergence of think tanks do not clearly answer the question of how
individuals as social atoms, or the wider public, can directly participate in energy and climate governance
without relying on agents such as government-approved social organizations, and what legitimate channels
are available for them to express their opinions. If a more inclusive carbon-neutral pathway is to be
achieved in China, these issues may need to be addressed.

4.2 The EU
The ambitious European Green Deal not only emphasises that all sectors in all countries will be part of
the green transition, so “leaving no one behind”, but also stresses that "everyone can contribute to finding
solutions" (European Commission, 2021). The European Climate Pact launched in March 2020 sets out a
concrete roadmap for action on this vision.
The European Climate Pact aims to provide an inclusive platform for people to share information and
knowledge, develop and promote solutions to climate change and give a voice to citizens and
stakeholders. A Secretariat under the leadership of the European Commission will assist the Commission
with the implementation. The European Climate Pact focuses on spreading awareness and supporting
action. In terms of spreading awareness, the European Commission will establish the role of Climate Pact
Ambassador, translate science-based information into practical climate action for the benefit of
communities, integrate climate knowledge into the education system, combat climate disinformation,
develop online and in-person climate activities to strengthen collective climate consensus, and include
vulnerable groups and regions in climate activities. Climate actions under 'The European Climate Pact' aim
to involve individuals and organisations who are empowered to launch their climate initiatives and pledges
or join others' initiatives through an online platform. Meanwhile, digital technologies and the contribution
of young people are additionally advocated (European Commission, 2021). The creation of this platform
has been able to stimulate more inclusive discussions and debates on energy and climate, however,
respondents are also urging that the platform can become an umbrella for local climate pacts, to scale up
successful local practices, and to focus more on local initiatives and engagement (EUROCITIES, 2020).
Apart from the newly developed Pact, as early as 2008, a network for climate action was started between
EU Member States through the New Covenant of Mayors, which brings together thousands of European
cities committed to action to support the implementation of the EU’s target to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 55% by 2030, and by 2050 builds a fairer, climate-neutral Europe for all. The New
Covenant of Mayors aspires to build a network that engages citizens, businesses, academics and all levels
of government while connecting with mayors and local leaders in Europe and beyond. The New
Covenant of Mayors' daily activities includes a wide range of workshops, discussion meetings, citizen
voice platforms, etc. It continues to operate after the European Climate Pact was implemented.
In addition to citizen engagement on climate at the EU level, member countries’ governments are also
actively promoting citizen engagement on the climate agenda. Citizens’ Assemblies are an increasingly
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popular format, such as Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly on Climate Change, which started in 2017, and the
Citizens Convention for Climate in France initiated in 2018. They can represent the wider general public
and bring them together to debate, draft proposals and vote on climate issues of concern. Citizens'
Assemblies establish a formal process to encourage citizens’ climate participation, but whether the public
opinion they convey can be incorporated into political decisions depends on the attitude of decisionmakers (Colli, 2021).
4.3 The US
While the US federal government under Trump’s tenure has been absent from the collective efforts of the
global climate community and energy transition, a number of energy and climate-relevant proposals
promoting an inclusive clean transition have still emerged from within the US. The House Select
Committee on the Climate Crisis was established by the House of Representatives in 2019 to make policy
recommendations to the US Congress to reduce pollution and address the climate crisis. In June 2020, the
Committee presented its final proposal to Congress: ‘Solving the Climate Crisis: The Congressional Action
Plan for a Clean Energy Economy and a Healthy and Just America’. Creating a climate solution with
equity and justice at its heart is one of the core elements of the proposal - keywords such as "public
participation", "engagement", "inclusion" and "community" appear frequently throughout the 500-page
report. And it argues that expanded, broad-based public consultation is necessary for policy development
related to the climate and energy transition. For example, in the section "Build the Capacity of
Organizations and Communities Working Toward Environmental Justice", the Committee recommended
that Congress provide more funding and training to "build the capacity of non-profit organizations and
community leaders in environmental justice communities" (House Select Committee on the Climate
Crisis, 2020).
Climate change and the clean energy transition were hot topics in the 2020 presidential election, with
then-Democratic nominee Joe Biden releasing his $1.7 trillion clean energy revolution and environmental
justice plan in June 2019, which referred to the need for “every American can participate in the clean
energy economy", while "all agencies to engage in community-driven approaches to develop solutions for
environmental injustices affecting communities of colour, low-income, and indigenous communities".
Since coming to power, President Biden has been doing his best to reverse the deregulation of the
environmental screening and abandonment of inclusion that developed under the Trump administration,
and there is also a significant re-emergence of public participation in the content of policymaking at the
domestic level concerning climate, environmental justice and energy transition issues. In numerous new
executive directives, the Biden administration proposes to make stakeholder participation an important
part of decision-making by the authorities. For example, an Office of Public Participation under the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was proposed to create for the first time, and this office aims to
increase the engagement of landowners and communities affected by infrastructure development,
environmental justice communities and tribal interests, as well as ordinary energy consumers and
consumer advocates (Vizcarra, Perls, 2021).
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At the same time, the breadth and depth of sub-national climate actions in the US have been increasing
over the past years, with sub-national actors (including states, cities and businesses) making significant
climate commitments accounting for approximately 70% of US GDP (Hultman, Gross, 2021). Civil
society groups have played an important role in the development of climate commitments by these subnational actors. Take Charlotte, North Carolina as an instance. In the Charlotte Future 2040
Comprehensive Plan, which is a long-term plan that guides the city's investments and developments in the
coming 20 years, the city used Community Conversations to gather the public’s voice to inform policy
development, as well as organising a variety of events such as virtual reality demonstrations, information
sessions, neighbourhood meetings and “Becoming an Ambassador” to ensure residents are integrated into
the Plan. In addition, the City of Charlotte also works with partners and community leaders to promote
equity and inclusion and expects to reach out to the 1% of the population through face-to-face meetings
over a two-year process to develop a shared vision for Charlotte’s future (García, Khandke, 2019).
5. Conclusions
China, the EU and the US have all made over-arching climate action pledges. To make sure that these toplevel commitments can be achieved, they need to be implemented effectively at the middle admin-unit
level, such as provinces in China, Member States in the EU and states in the US. This paper argues that
middle admin-level policies and the governance model play an important role in determining the
effectiveness of decarbonisation policies. It is thus imperative to put more emphasis on analysing the
multi-level governance model, in addition to national or supra-national level targets and policies.
By analysing the polities and politics of climate and energy multi-level governance within the three blocs,
the paper highlights the difference between the role of target responsibility and cadre evaluation
mechanism embedded in the Five-year Planning in China, and by contrast, the dominant role of legislation
in the EU and the US. Comparing these two multi-level governance models, there are certain advantages
of the target responsibility system, such as more flexibility and effectiveness in policy implementation.
However, the target responsibility system might incentivise bureaucrats to optimize for performance,
sometimes sacrificing the well-being of the citizens, or incentivising local governments to fake statistical
numbers.
The next natural question to be asked is: given the difference in their multi-level governance models,
which bloc is the most effective and efficient in decarbonising their economy and reaching their respective
climate goals. On the one hand, it is still early to reach a conclusion or even give a comprehensive
comparison on the progress so far. The European Union established the goal to reduce GHG emissions
by 15% in 2010 compared to the 1990 level in preparation for the Kyoto COP in 1997. The latest Green
Deal with a long-term carbon neutral goal in 2050 was first brought forward only two years ago in 2019,
and the European Climate Law was passed in 2021. Similarly, although China already established the
Leading Group for Climate Change, Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction in 2007, the
overarching “Dual Carbon Goals” was only voiced in 2020. The latest US climate goal was set by the
Biden Administration in 2021. In short, it is too soon to assess the progress of three blocs’ long-term
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emission reduction targets. On the other hand, plenty of literature has compared the effectiveness of
certain climate policies in the three blocs. For example, Zhang, M (2017) compared the carbon emission
trading schemes (ETS) in the EU and China, by comparing specific design aspects of the ETS such as cap
determination, the coverage, allocation methods, trading participants and allowance category etc.
However, the article was not able to identify which ETS is better or worse due to the difference in the two
countries’ political and economic status as well as the development stage of the ETS. Compston (2014)
compared the climate policy strength in six economies: China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, and Japan.
The article chose six key policy instruments: carbon taxes, emissions trading, feed-in tariffs, renewable
energy quotas, fossil fuel power plant bans, and vehicle emissions standards. It was found that each
economy leads in one or more areas, challenging the belief that anyone economy or governance system
has a clear advantage over the others in all areas in climate policies. Another article from the World
Economic Forum intended to compare the climate action between the US and China based on two
criteria: investment in clean energy and innovation capacity. The difficulties in comparing climate policy
effectiveness are two folds. First, one can only compare certain specific climate policy instruments as
proxies, and the choice is arbitrary. Secondly, it remains debatable whether the effectiveness should be
based on absolute carbon emission, emission per capita or energy intensity. Another question is the choice
of baseline year and whether historical emission should be taken into account. These criteria have
implications, considering China has a much larger population base and is still in the stage of rapid
urbanization and high economic growth. In conclusion, it is difficult to assess which countries’ climate
policy is more effective, and thus difficult to conclude which multi-level climate governance model is
better.
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that all three economies can draw valuable lessons from the governance
model in the other regions. For example, China can and has already embarked on a journey to strengthen
its environmental legislation and litigation system. The development of Environmental NGOs (ENGOs)
has drawn the attention of worldwide scholars, especially their role in environmental public interest
lawsuits to monitor polluters and enforce environmental laws at local and provincial levels(Wilson, 2016)
(Matsuzawa, 2012). Similarly, China can strengthen civil society participation in its climate action.
Participation is not only a democratic right that contributes to policy ownership and credibility, but also
enhances capacity building. Moreover, the inclusion of different stakeholders and perspectives from
different social groups is beneficial to developing and implementing policies that take everybody's
concerns into account and guarantee a just transition. Due to distinct developmental stages of respective
civil societies, public participation plays different roles in energy and climate governance in China, the EU,
and the US, and the depth and impact of participation vary. On the other hand, it is worth questioning
whether the US and the EU can learn from China’s Five-Year Planning in that it creates long-term and
stable policy expectations that give the private sector incentives to transform their business model or
double down green investments.
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By analysing the “polities” and “politics”, this paper sheds light on the features, differences and
similarities between the EU, US and China in the top-down and bottom-up decision-making process for
climate policy, the central-local mechanism to ensure implementation of its policies, and citizens’
participation in the multi-level governance in these three blocs. It remains too early and difficult to draw
the conclusion which governance model is the most effective, but all three economies’ multi-level climate
and energy governance models are tailored to suit their respective cultural, social and economic
development status, and each has something to learn from the other two.
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